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DECLARATORY ORDERS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD
Robert John Hickey*
I. The Nature of a Declaratory Order
Section 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides: "The agency,
with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound discretion, may
issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty."'
In order to establish a point of departure, the declaratory order must be
defined. Basically, it is a procedure whereby an administrative agency in its
sound discretion makes a noncoercive, definite, binding, and reviewable adjudica-
tion declaring actual, present, substantive rights of adverse parties on a question
of law. The adjudication determines the question of law in advance of affrmative
action by the parties that would normally entail legal sanctions.2 This administra-
tive action, while it does not affirmatively order a party to take specific action,
is an effective remedy for many disputes since it relieves a party of the risk of
transgressing the law in order to determine his rights.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the potential and unique suit-
ability of the declaratory order for achieving stability in labor-management re-
lations. Specifically, the declaratory order should be a very useful tool of the
National Labor Relations Board in determining jurisdictional, representation, and
unfair labor practice issues.
As the administrative process with its pervasive power has attempted to
regulate the dynamic and complex area of labor relations, a staggering volume
of litigation and accompanying administrative decisions has been generated.
Synergistically, the morass of opinions, administrative decisions, and regulations
itself begets areas of uncertainty, producing more litigation and more
administrative decisions. Unfortunately, the end of this cycle is nowhere
in sight. While the administrative process may be uncontrollable, the un-
certainty created by it is not. In dealing with administrative arms of the
government, every citizen should be able to know, by the most expeditious and
most economical method, what is expected of him. It is the duty of the ad-
* Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C.; formerly attorney with Na-
tional Labor Relations Board; L.L.B., Harvard Law School; L.L.M., Georgetown Law School.
1 Administrative Procedure Act § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. ;§ 554(e) (Supp. III, 1968). Every
tribunal having the power to adjudicate necessarily has the power to render a binding de-
claratory order, for declaratory orders are merely a form of adjudication. Therefore, any
agency with adjudicative powers should be able to grant declaratory relief, whether or not
the statute expressly authorizes it. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE § 4:10, at
268 (1958).
2 See generally W. ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1941); E. BORCHAMn, DECLAR-
ATORY JUDGMENTS (1941); 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATiV E LAW TREATISE § 4:10 (1958);
Borre, The Advantages of the Declaratory Judgment in Administrative Law, 18 MODERN L.
Rav. 138 (1955); Goldner, Declaratory Actions, 2 CATHOLIC U. L. Rnv. 1 (1951); Russel
& Prather, Declaratory Judgment Before Administrative Procedure, (pt. 1), 43 ILL. B.J. 936(1955), (pt. 2), 44 ILL. B.J. 58 (1955); Vogeler, Declaratory Rulings in Administrative
Agencies, 31 Ky. L.J. 20 (1942); Note, Administrative Declaratory Orders, 13 STAN. L. REv.
307 (1961); Note, Basic Misconceptions of the Declaratory Judgment Law, 12 Wyo. L.J. 66
(1957).
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ministrative agency to interpret the law and regulations it administers so that each
citizen can carry on his activities without fear of future reprisal.
The National Labor Relations Board, as an important medium for the
smooth functioning of government in the sphere of labor relations, must afford
employers, unions, and employees assistance in determining in advance whether
a proposed course of conduct will, if pursued, violate the law. This goal may be
accomplished by many means, including well-reasoned and well-written decisions,
decisions with prospective sanctions, and rulemaking. More liberal use of the
declaratory order would be especially helpful in achieving this goal.
The distinctive advantage of a declaratory order is that irreparable injury
need not be incurred before doubts about the effects of projected activity may be
removed. By enabling the legal question to be raised and decided at the inception
of the controversy, rather than in proceedings to redress a violation committed, the
declaratory order brings important legal issues (which might not otherwise be
litigated) to the attention of the administrative agency and also permits legal
controversies to be settled without destroying the status quo. This process meets
the growing need of the industrial world for a means of settling controversies
promptly without a disruption of the economy. The demands of commerce re-
quire a stability in the industrial equilibrium that can be maintained only by
adjudicating disputes before they ripen into violence or full-grown battles with
their accumulation of bitterness and impaired relations. Such stability is essential
to facilitate long-range economic planning. For such planning to be effective,
all participants must be able to ascertain the legal effects of their future activities;
the declaratory order will often be the surest and most economical method of
obtaining the requisite assurance.
The declaratory order further serves to narrow the issues of a controversy
by removing the side issues that often infect labor-management disputes. By
so narrowing the issues before the law is transgressed, the parties can focus on
the point in dispute and perhaps settle it. Thus, preventive law is encouraged.
Unfortunately, under what appears to be the Board's present approach to
the declaratory process, a party is often faced with the dilemma of assuming the
risk of acting upon his view of an uncertain area of the law or not acting at all.
A dynamic application of the declaratory order, where a justiciable controversy
exists, would often resolve this dilemma.
For a declaratory order to issue under section 5 (d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act [APA], the matter in controversy must be authorized by statute
to be determined on the record by an agency, which, after an opportunity for
hearing, will issue an order.3 Any true adjudication is a process of formulating,
3 Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. III, 1968), provides in part:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, in every case
of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved -
(1) a matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts denovo in a court;
(2) the selection or tenure of an employee, except a hearing examiner
appointed under section 3105 of this title;
(3) proceedings in which decisions rest solely on inspections, tests, or
elections;
(4) the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions;
(5) cases in which an agency is acting as an agent for a court; or
[Fall, 1969]
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after an opportunity for hearing, an order that is a final, binding, authoritative
disposition precisely defining the jural relationship of the parties to the contro-
versy. An adjudication need not purport to lay down any general rule beyond
the normal incidents of res judicata and stare decisis that the decision will have.
All of these characteristics are found in a declaratory order.' The order is binding,
and thus reviewable in a court of law,' differing from other judgments only in that
it lacks a coercive element. Rather than imposing penalties or commanding the
parties to do or abstain the declaratory order declares rights. It cannot be enforced
against anyone unless the issuing agency believes that a party has acted contrary
to the law as it has been declared in the order. Only then, in separate proceed-
ings, can the agency enforce its declaration. It is, therefore, apparent that the
declaration itself constitutes the order.0
Since the declaratory order is by nature remedial and procedural, it can
neither create any substantive right or duty nor can it augment or diminish the
agency's jurisdiction. As a remedial device, it merely authorizes a new form of
relief, not a new form of action. As a procedural device that partakes of proper-
ties both legal and equitable, the declaratory order affords the agency a flexible
and straightforward method of determining the rights of parties.
A. Justiciable Controversy
To maintain an action for declaratory relief, all the usual procedural and
substantive requirements of the ordinary action must be exhibited except, of
course, that a completed violation need not be shown. Unless these requirements
are met, the moving party is not seeking a decision that will fix his legal rights,
and declaratory relief should not be granted. Therefore, to obtain a declaratory
order it is necessary to show the existence of a justiciable controversy.'
In order to constitute a justiciable controversy, there must be sufficient
legal interest in a party capable of being substantially affected. "Sufficient in-
(6) the certification of worker representatives.
(e) The agency.. . may issue a declaratory order ....
4 1 K. DAvis, ADzNxSTRATIVE LAw TREAT SE § 4: 10, at 270-71 (1958).
5 Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151, 160 (1957). See K. DAvis, supra
note 4, at 271.
6 The term declaratory order appears to be a misnomer, since no formal order need be
given.
7 The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2 '(1964), does not
modify the requirements for invoking federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court initially made
this clear in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937), when it stated:
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to "cases of actual con-
troversy," manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is operative only
m respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense. . .. Thus the
operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.
It should be noted however, that the constitutional limitation to "case and controversy"
applicable to the federal courts is not strictly imposed upon an administrative agency. Section
5(d) of the APA expressly authorizes agencies to grant declaratory relief not only to terminate
a controversy but also to "remove uncertainty." Administrative Procedure Act § 5(d), 5
U.S.C. § 554(e) (Supp. III, 1968). As a matter of statutory interpretation, the only possible
meaning that can be given to the words "remove uncertainty" is that Congress intended to
expand the availability of declaratory relief beyond its application to orthodox controversies.
How far an agency should go in lessening the justiciability requirement should be determined
on a case by case basis.
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terest," however, has proved difficult to define. Generally the movant for de-
claratory relief must show that he has some legally protected interest that has
been placed in jeopardy or uncertainty by an adverse cdaim' Whether a party
will be substantially affected by the act of another will depend on both the nature
of the act and the manner in which it will affect the party; both factors must be
reflected in the pleadings and the evidence. In order to insure that a substan-
tial interest will be reflected in the case file, it is necessary that the parties be
adverse, though not necessarily hostile.' This requirement insures that all relevant
facts, issues, and arguments will be refined to the same extent that is required
to assure competent advocacy in an ordinary case. There should be no doubt that
one party's acts are sufficiently definite to constitute a threat to the other party.
A mere difference of opinion as to a point of law is not sufficient to justify agency
action, since administrative bodies are not created for the purpose of resolving
hypothetical or academic disputes. Only when the facts underlying a dispute
show a real threat to a party's interest can an agency be satisfied that the an-
tagonistic claims presented by the parties indicate imminent and inevitable liti-
gation.
Judicial machinery must be conserved for problems that have sufficiently
matured to be ripe for final determination. ° If a controversy is not ripe, the
parties cannot adequately present the issues involved with the factual fullness
necessary for an intelligent decision. The problem of ripeness is particularly
troublesome in the area of declaratory relief since the declaratory mechanism
permits an action before the controversy would have been ripe for adjudication
under the normal postviolative test. As a general rule, an issue is ripe for
declaratory relief when the adverse interests of the parties have crystalized so as
to be clearly reflected in existing facts; when the threat of interference with a
protected right is present, immediate, and substantial; and when it is relatively
certain that action and litigation would ensue if the declaratory order were
refused."
B. Judicial Review
Under section 10(c) of the APA, a declaratory order issued by an ad-
ministrative agency is subject to judicial review in the same manner as any other
adjudication. 2 As stated by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania R.R. v. United
8 Ohio Gas. Ins. Co. v. Marr, 98 F.2d 973, 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
652 (1938).
9 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952).
10 Barker Painting Co. v. Painters Local 734, 281 U.S. 462, 463-64 (1930). Thus the
dilemma that is prejudicing a party's position must be present, not remote or speculative. Public
Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952). In this regard, the Board should
not declare either contingent rights until they have become fixed under an existing state
of facts or future rights in anticipation of contingent events that may not occur. The Board
will, however, declare a present right where the infringement of such right may not arise until
a future time. Klinker v. Klinker, -, Gal. App. 2d -, 283 P.2d 83, 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
This is grounded on the theory that an interest is present when it is being threatened by a
future event certain to occur were it not for the Board's declaration.
11 Klinker v. Klinker, - Cal. App. 2d -, -, 283 P.2d 83, 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
It must be noted that under section 5(d) the Board grants declaratory relief in its "sound
discretion." In determining whether to utilize this device, the Board must consider such
factors as time, personnel and budget.
12 Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. I1, 1968).
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States, "an order that determines a 'right and obligation' so that 'legal conse-
quences' will flow from it is reviewable"',.
While a declaration granted by an agency ,is reviewable, it is uncertain to
what extent, if any, a refusal to grant a declaration is reviewable. Since, under
section 5(d), the agency may grant relief "in its sound discretion," the issue is
whether this discretion is absolute. The addition of the word sound before dis-
cretion indicates that Congress intended that this discretion be reviewable if the
agency arbitrarily withholds relief. Still, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal
Power Commission," the only case considering this question, held that this dis-
cretion is unreviewable. The court indicated that since plaintiff was not required
to do or refrain from doing anything he was not aggrieved by the commission. 5
This type of reasoning once supported the discredited "negative order" doctrine
abolished in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States.16 In that case the
Court noted that distinctions between action and nonaction did not meet the
real considerations involved in these problems' In this light, the decision in
United Gas Pipe Line Co. is very questionable.
C. Res Judicata
If declaratory orders are to fulfill' their function of affording the parties
dependable guidance for the conduct of their affairs, a party must be able to
rely on an order's finality. This is accomplished by the doctrine of res judicata,8
insofar as it is applicable to administrative adjudications. Res judicata enables
a party to rely on an order's finality, thus affording dependable guidance for
future decisions. The doctrine, however, has no blanket application to adminis-
trative determinations since the party's interest in a final settlement does not
always outweigh the public's interest in the flexibility of administrative agencies. 9
Where an agency changes its policy following the issuance of a declaratory order,
the protection afforded by the order should extend to action taken in reliance on
the order but preceding the promulgation of the policy change. While an agency
13 363 U.S. 202, 205 (1960).
14 203 F.2d 78, 79 (5th Cir. 1953). The right to review an agency's dismissal of a peti-
tion for a declaratory order is further indicated by the legislative history of the APA. The
Senate Judiciary Committee suggested the need for review stating:
Private parties object to leaving the issuance of declaratory orders to agency
discretion. However, the phrase "sound discretion" means a reviewable discretion
and will prevent agencies from either giving improvident declaratory orders or
arbitrarily withholding such orders in proper cases. ADmsNSTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, LErGSLTMVM ISToRY, S.Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946).
15 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 203 F.2d 78, 79 (5th Cir. 1953).
16 307 U.S. 125 (1939).
17 Id. at 141.
18 Res judicata prevents a second litigation of the same issues between the same parties.
The rationale for the doctrine lies in preventing harassment by an opposing party who has
had his day in court.
19 That the res judicata doctrine has some application to administrative rulings has been
made clear by the Supreme Court in United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 348 U.S. 394,
422-23 (1966):
Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that res judicata principles
do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such language is certainly too broad.
When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves dis-
puted issues of fact properly before it. .. the courts have not hesitated.., to enforce
repose.
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may change its policy to the detriment of the decision holder (in that he may
no longer rely on the old order to justify his future actions), judicial sanction of
this practice will usually depend on the form, purpose, and effects of the change.2"
The finality of the declaratory order is the quality that most recommends
it over the use of advisory opinions in the field of labor relations. As distinguished
from a declaratory order, an advisory opinion is not binding" and thus not
judicially reviewable. From the parties' viewpoint, the most serious shortcoming
of an advisory opinion is the absence of res judicata effect. Thus, while an ad-
visory opinion eliminates some uncertainty, it does not provide the predictability
afforded by the declaratory order.22 The party accepting the advice still faces
the possibility that the agency, after a change in policy or administration, will
analyze the same problem in an altogether different light and dismiss, modify or
ignore its prior ruling. Hence the individual with only an advisory opinion in
hand is faced with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, he may act upon the
agency's advice; but if the agency's policy should change, he will not be able to
claim reliance on the opinion in the courts. On the other hand, he may dis-
regard the advisory opinion; but any large investment he might make in reliance
on his own interpretation of the law will be at risk, and he may ultimately incur
legal sanctions for his action.
On the other hand, advisory opinions are not totally unreliable. In the
usual case the agency feels some obligation to consistency, considers itself in-
formally bound by its former opinions, and will not often revise its original
rulings or alter its standards to the detriment of an opinion holder. For this
reason, an agency will carefully consider all questions before rendering an advisory
opinion. Moreover, the courts appear to be broadening the area in which an
20 Res judicata tends to be applied more often in cases involving heavy liabilities than
in those instances where only a cease and desist order is sought. Compare Mine Workers v.
Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335 (1945) with FTC v. Raladam Co., 316
U.S. 149 (1942).
The doctrine of res judicata is also affected by the ability of a tribunal to reopen, rehear,
or reconsider a case. The problem here is that a continuation of jurisdiction through the use
of such powers might in fact amount to commencement of a new proceeding. In this regard,
Mr. Justice Roberts laid down the following rules to govern the Board in Mine Workers v.
Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 341 '(1945):
Until the transcript . . . is filed in court, the Board may, after reasonable notice,
modify any finding or order in whole or in part. After the case has come under the
jurisdiction of the court, either party may apply . . . for remand to the Board.
There is no dearth of discretion . . . for its exercise, but opportunities should not
be unlimited. If the petitioners are right, it must follow that in any case in which
the court refuses to remand, the Board need merely wait until the "final" decree
is entered and then proceed to resume jurisdiction, ignore the court's decree, and
come again to it, asking its imprimatur on a new order.
21 In City Line Open Hearth, Inc., 141 NLRB 799, 801 (1963), the relative impotence
of the advisory opinion as compared to the declaratory order was pointed out:
Nor does the issuance of the Advisory Opinion herein constitute a declaratory order
within the meaning of Section 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Section
5(d) envisages final adjudications binding upon the parties. On the other hand,
the Board's Advisory Opinions do not contemplate such binding adjudications, but
are merely advisory in nature ....
22 See Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 IARv.
L. REv. 1086, 1096 (1960), which criticizes Board advisory opinions rendered pursuant to
that act.
23 In Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1173 (1928), the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue changed a stock valuation made by his predecessor and assessed an addi-
tional $9,500,000 tax. See also Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merril, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
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agency may be estopped.24 In view of this trend, the line of distinction between
declaratory orders and advisory opinions is becoming more difficult to locate.
As the line disappears, the distinction necessarily becomes one of degree. Never-
theless, since the legal distinction remains even as the practical becomes blurred,
it is important to the party that the ruling be declaratory.
II. The Use of Declaratory Orders in NLRB Proceedings
A. Jurisdiction
The National- Labor Relations Board has expressly provided for declaratory
orders in the determination of jurisdictional questions. Section 102.105 of the
Board's rules and regulations states:
Whenever both an unfair labor practice charge and a representation
case relating to the same employer are contemporaneously on file in a
regional office of the Board, and the general counsel entertains doubt
whether the Board would assert jurisdiction over the employer involved, he
may file a petition with the Board for a declaratory order disposing of the
jurisdictional issue in the cases. Such petition may be withdrawn at any
time prior to the issuance of the Board's order.25
Section 102.110 provides in part:
The Board shall thereupon proceed, upon the petition, responses, and
submission of briefs, to determine whether, on the facts before it, the com-
merce operations of the employer involved are such that it would or would
not assert jurisdiction over them. Such determination shall be made by
a declaratory order, with like effect as in the case of other orders of the
Board and shall be served on the parties.
28
In Stor-Ad Printers, Inc.,21 where the first declaratory order was issued under
these rules, the General Counsel filed a petition requesting a declaration whether
the Board would assert jurisdiction over an employer engaged in the intrastate
printing and distribution of mail advertising circulars. Upon determining that
the employer's operation was not such that jurisdiction would attach, the Board
24 In Planet Constr. Corp. v. Board of Educ., 7 N.Y.2d 381, 385, 165 N.E.2d 758,
760-61, 198 N.Y.S.2d 68, 72 (1960), the court unequivocally announced that "[e]stoppel
may apply to a municipality as well as to an individual." In Gruber v. Mayor & Township
Comm., 39 N.J. 1, 13, 161 A.2d 489, 495 "(1962), the court referred favorably to
legal writings and judicial decisions which indicate the strong recent trend towards
the application of equitable principles of estoppel against public bodies where the
interests of justice, morality and common fairness dictate that course.
For an extensive discussion of the potential of the doctrine of estoppel in administrative
law, see Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable? Proposals as to Estoppel and Related
Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 CoLUar. L. Rav. 374 (1953).
25 29 C.F.R. § 102.105 (1969).
26 29 C.F.R. § 102.110 (1969). The binding nature of such an order is clearly set out in
section 101.43 of the Statements of Procedure: "The declaratory Board order will be binding
on the parties.. .. " 29 C.F.R. § 101.43(f) (1969).
27 131 NLRB 556 (1961). For the effect of res judicata on Board jurisdictional decisions,
see Jefferson Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 90 NLRB 1911, 1916 (1950), where the Board held
that the employer was engaged in commerce since the jurisdictional issue had been resolved in
a prior proceeding, and the employer presented no new evidence in the subsequent proceeding.
[Vol. 45: 89]
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declared that it would not assert jurisdiction over the employer's operation. 8
Notwithstanding the declaratory orders potential role in determining juris-
dictional questions, the Board has self-imposed restrictions upon its use. In two
recent declaratory order cases,29 where the question concerned the Board's juris-
diction over foreign-flag ships, the Board refused to grant the requested declara-
tions. Since foreign-flag vessels are dearly within commerce, and since the volume
of their operations normally meets the Board's discretionary standards, they would
appear to come within the Board's jurisdiction. But, since a decision in this
matter would have affected our national foreign policy, and since the Supreme
Court had not addressed the question,"0 the Board proceeded cautiously. The
Board ultimately dismissed the petitions for declaratory orders with the following
statement:
The Board has duly considered the matter. It has decided that its
declaratory order rules, like those for advisory opinions, are designed pri-
marily to determine questions of jurisdiction by the application of the
Board's discretionary standards to the "commerce operations" of an employer.
However, there are situations where, because of the complex nature of the
operation involved, or because of the inadequacy of the record, the pro-
cedures contemplated by the Board's rules for declaratory orders and advisory
opinions are difficult or impossible to apply .... Where, as here, there ap-
parently are complicated factual and legal issues, it is desirable first to secure
a complete record, based upon a full hearing. At that hearing all interested
parties would have the opportunity to introduce evidence, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, to file briefs, to argue orally, and to participate to
the extent necessary to present their positions. The Board is of the view
that in this particular case these procedures are necessary to enable it to
make an informed judgment on the jurisdictional issue which has been
raised.3 '
Significantly, the Board did not continue the application for the declaratory
order pending the outcome of a hearing. There is nothing inherent in a declara-
tory order that demands that it be granted upon facts presented in a petition rather
than upon facts determined at a hearing. Nor is the use of the hearing to determine
questions of jurisdiction novel in Board law. Hearings are often conducted to de-
termine whether particular employees come within the scope of the National
Labor Relations Act. The purposes served by the declaratory order would be
28 Stor-Ad Printers, Inc., 131 NLRB 556, 557 (1961). Under section 3(d) of the Act,
the General Counsel has final authority with respect to the issuance of unfair labor practice
complaints. A question could be raised whether, under a declaratory order proceeding, the
Board could order dismissal of both the representation case and the unfair labor practice com-
plaint, since this might infringe upon the General Counsel's power under section 3(d). As
a legal matter, however, the General Counsel, by filing the petition for a declaratory order,
consents to be bound by the Board's determination. Also, as a practical matter, it would be
a waste of agency resources for the General Counsel to disregard the Board's ruling and to
proceed with the case only to have it later dismissed by the Board. In the Stor-Ad case the
General Counsel did dismiss both the representation case and the unfair labor practice charge,
and it can be expected that this procedure will be followed in similar cases.
29 National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 134 NLRB 1186 (1961); Reynolds Metal Co., 134
NLRB 1187 (1961).
30 Two years later, in McVulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1963), the
Court held the Act inapplicable to foreign vessels.
31 National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 134 NLRB 1186, 1186-87 (1961); Reynolds Metal Co.,
134 NLRB 1187, 1187-88 (1961).
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significantly advanced by the application of the hearing procedure to requests
for declaratory orders. By deciding the above cases as it did, however, the Board
substantially limited the potential usefulness of the declaratory order in determin-
ing jurisdictional questions.
Another very important restriction on the use of the declaratory order has
flowed from these same two cases. In them the Board "decided that its declara-
tory order rules, like those for advisory opinions, are designed primarily to deter-
mine questions of jurisdiction by the application of the Board's discretionary
standards to the 'commerce operations' of an employer." 2 On its face, this state-
ment would seem to absolutely preclude the use of neither the declaratory order
nor the advisory opinion when the Board's statutory ("nondiscretionary") juris-
diction is in issue, but such has been the result. The cases concerning advisory
opinions uniformly indicate that declaratory orders and advisory opinions are
to be treated equally on this score, and these cases do not hesitate to dismiss
applications for advisory opinions on the Board's statutory jurisdiction."3 Hence
it appears that the Board will not entertain petitions for declaratory orders con-
cerning statutory jurisdiction.
The origin of this rule, then, is traceable to the complexity and difficulty of
the foreign-flag ship cases, where the Board felt unjustified in resolving the issue
without a full and complete record. Yet, as we have seen, there is no reason why
a declaratory order could not be granted pursuant to a factual hearing. While
the Board's position is defensible with respect to advisory opinions (where the
merits of the case are before a state court or board), there is no merit in refusing
an application for a declaratory order simply because the issue presented con-
cerns the Board's statutory, rather than its discretionary, jurisdiction.
This restriction on the use of the declaratory order seems especially strange
since the declaratory order has been used to clarify questions involving status.
In Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railing Co., the Supreme Court recognized
the binding effect of declarations of status."4 Certainly, a mechanism capable
of dealing with questions of status is capable of determining discretionary juris-
diction issues.
B. Representation Cases
In the representation area, the Board has three major functions: (1) initial
32 National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 134 NLRB 1186 (1961); Reynolds Metal Co., 134 NLRB
1187 '(1961). The Board in these cases nevertheless refused to use the declaratory order to
determine the discretionary jurisdiction question presented. The reason was that the cases
were complex and the Board did not have a full record before it. National Bulk Carriers,
Inc., 134 NLRB 1186 (1961); Reynolds Metal Co., 134 NLRB 1187 (1961). See also W.
WrLSON, LAnoR LAW HAND oom 104, at 11 (1963). In Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd., 138
NLRB 221 (1962), an advisory opinion case, the inadequacy of the record was similarly cited as
a ground for dismissing the petition. Id. at 222. Other advisory opinion cases, however,
dismiss petitions with the simple statement that statutory, rather than discretionary, jurisdiction
is in issue. Cases cited note 33, infra.
33 International Air Serv., Inc., 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,027; Mayo Clinic, 1967 CCH
NLRB Dec. 27,956; Mt. Pleasant Pub. Util., 156 NLRB 79 (1965); James M. Casida, 152
NLRB 526 '(1965); Broward County Port Authority, 144 NLRB 1539 (1963); Interlake S.S.
Co., 138 NLRB 576 (1962).
34 305 U.S. 177, 182 (1939). Accord, Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S.
125, 143 (1939), which held a declaratory order determining the status of a telephone com-
pany binding and therefore subject to judicial review.
[Vol. 45:89]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
determination of an appropriate unit; (2) clarifying or amending the unit de-
scription as necessary; and (3) conducting an election among the employees in
the appropriate unit to determine whether they desire a particular union as their
bargaining representative."5
1. Determining an Appropriate Unit
A role for the declaratory order is not required in making this initial de-
termination since the Board's representation procedures are similar in function
to a declaratory order. Thus, the Board's determination of an appropriate unit
does not carry with it any sanction. Punitive measures are not taken until the em-
ployer refuses to recognize the union chosen, after election, by employees in the
appropriate unit, or until a rival union pickets the employer with a recognitional
intent. In these circumstances, the Board will file unfair labor practice com-
plaints against the offending party."6 The problem here lies not so much in the
representation procedures, but in the failure of the Act to provide for a direct
appeal to the courts from the Board's determination.
2. Clarifying or Amending Unit Descriptions
In the past, the Board has often been asked to determine, through a motion
to clarify or amend a certificate, the placement (inclusion or exclusion from a
unit) of employees whose status had been originally established through Board
certification but which is now in dispute. The Board has assumed that it has
authority to clarify its original bargaining unit determination and certification,
without holding a new election, even though there is no specific authority for
this in the National Labor Relations Act." The rendering of a declaratory clarifica-
35 As noted earlier, one of the characteristics of a declaratory order is its binding finality.
There is some question, however, as to the applicability of the res judicata doctrine to rep-
resentation questions. In Thalhinaer Bros. Inc., 93 NLR.B 726, 727 (1951), the Board held
that res judicata did not bar redetermination of a bargaining unit. One court has held that
res judicata has no application to the determination of an appropriate unit for collective
bargaining. District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565, 568 (4th Cir. 1956). But the Board
must respect the parties' need for stability. Thus, a more realistic analysis is that res judicata
has only limited application to representation cases.
36 The employer would be in violation of section 8(a) (5) of the Act, which, in pertinent
part, provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees....
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
The union would be in violation of section 8(b) (7) of the Act, which, in pertinent part,
provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
(7) to picket . . . any employer where an object thereof is forcing . . . an
employer to recognize . . . a labor organization . . . unless such labor organiza-
tion is currently certified ....
National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1964).
37 In Clarostat Mfg. Co., 105 NLRB 20, 22 (1953), the Board clarified its original
bargaining unit determination after a further hearing. The Board rejected the employer's
claim that it was error to reopen the case when the union could have pursued its remedy in
a complaint proceeding. Id.
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tion "flows from the Board's statutory authority to administer the Act and is an
incident of the B oard's responsibility under the Act.""8
The Board has had more difficulty with a motion to clarify an uncertified
unit. The first case involving this issue came before the Board in Lake Tankers
Corp.9 There the employer had for some time recognized the International
Longshoremen's Association [ILA] as the bargaining representative of its un-
licensed, nonsupervisory personnel. When a dispute arose over the supervisory
status of watchmen, a petition was filed. Since the employer did not question the
majority status of ILA, the Board found that no question concerning represen-
tation existed and dismissed the petition. In a footnote, however, the Board,
after reciting the duties of the watchmen, stated that it was "of the opinion that
the watchmen are supervisors within the meaning of the Act."4 Thus it obliquely
resolved the point in dispute. This technique of resolving the dispute while dis-
missing the petition was followed in a series of cases.4
In Bell Telephone Co., 2 however, the Board reversed this policy. There
the employer had recognized the union as the exclusive bargaining representative
of various categories of employees for more than fifteen years. The basis of this
relationship Was contractual, without benefit of Board certification. During nego-
tiations for an amended contract, the employer fied a petition with the Board
requesting a declaratory order concerning the supervisory status of certain em-
ployees. The petition stated that the union did represent a majority of the em-
ployees and that neither the employer nor the union desired an election.
While the Board noted that there was precedent for making such a de-
termination, it concluded that such action exceeded the power conferred upon
the Board by Congress. The Board stated:
Were the Board to decide this case on its merits, such a determination
could not possibly be a, declaratory judgment binding on the parties. A
declaratory judgment is a creature of the statute which authorizes it. There
is no statute authorizing the Board to render declaratory judgments in rep-
resentation cases. Consequently, at best a decision herein would be an
advisory opinion binding on no one. Nowhere in the Act is the Board, either
expressly or by necessary implication, empowered to give advisory opinions
on matters of this type.43
The Board's conclusion that it did not possess the statutory powers to make
such a determination was based on the following reasons:
Section 9 of the Act is the source of Board authority in representation
proceedings. Section 9(c) (1) provides, in part, that "Whenever a petition
shall have been filed . .. the Board shall investigate such petition ...
38 City Line Open Hearth, Inc., 141 NLRB 799, 801 (1963), which involved the Board's
power to issue advisory jurisdictional opinions.
39 79 NLRB 442 (1948).
40 Id. at 442 n.2.
41 Hershy Estates, 122 NLRB 1300 (1955); Humble Pipe Line, Co., 107 NLRB 892
(1954); Houston Terminal Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 107 NLRB 290 (1953); Luper
Transp. Co., 92 NLRB 1178 (1951); Librascope, Inc., 91 NLRB 178 (1950); York Motor
Express Co., 82 NLRB 801 (1949); W.K.B.H., 81 NLRB 63 *(1949); Deep Rock Oil Corp.
81 NLRB 10 (1949); Merril-Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Co., 79 NLRB 962 (1948).
42 118 NLRB 371 (1957).
43 Id. at 374.
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If the Board finds .. . that ... -a question of representation exists, it shall
direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the result thereof." Thus,
the Act mandates a direction of election by the Board if a question con-
cerning representation is found to exist ....
We cannot believe that Congress, saving specifically provided an ef-
fective procedure for definitive resolution of unit issues in Section 9 (c) (1), at
the same time intended to authorize the Board to derogate from that proce-
dure in cases of this type by giving an advisory opinion which is not binding
upon the parties or the Board, and where if one of the parties is dissatisfied
with the Board's view, it could file a petition at an appropriate time covering
all employees in the unit or a refusal-to-bargain charge seeking to obtain
a redetermination of the status of the employees involved. One of the
fundamental purposes of Congress in Section 9(c) of the Act was to devise
a method whereby the scope of the entire unit involved would be before
the Board so that most, if not all, of the possible unit problems could be
resolved at one time and a certification could issue which would be binding
on the parties. We do not think that Congress wished to place the Board
in the position of dissipating its funds and energies in the capacity of
arbitrator, mediator, or conciliator by providing a forum for parties to
submit their questions on a piecemeal basis without any reasonable assurance
that the Board's determination will thereby finally resolve even the specific
problem presented by the parties.
4 4
The Board's position in Bell Telephone assumed: (1) that the issuance of a
declaratory order was beyond the scope of its delegated powers; and (2) that
the determination of representation questions, which would not be binding on the
parties and which could resolve such questions only on a piecemeal basis, was
contrary to the Act's policy. The first assumption is based on the following
syllogism: the declaratory judgment is a creature of statute; there is no statute
authorizing the Board to issue a declaratory order in representation cases; hence,
the Board has no power to issue a declaratory judgment in this area. While there
is no specific provision in the Act authorizing the utilization of a declaratory
process in representation cases, this power is inherent in the Board's power to
adjudicate since a declaratory order is just another form of adjudication. Thus,
as a general proposition, an agency with the power to adjudicate has the power
to declare, absent a statutory restriction on this power.45 The issue, therefore, is
whether there exists such a restriction, either explicitly in the National Labor
Relations Act, or implicitly through the limitations placed on such power by the
administrative process.
As for the Act itself, section 9," which controls the representation process,
44 Id. at 373-74. The Board followed this position in American Stores Co., 130 NLRB
678, 679 (1961). There the employer sought a determination from the Board as to the
appropriateness of a single or separate unit of its grocery store employees. The parties stipulated
that each union involved represented a majority of employees in the respective units they
sought that one of the unions represented a majority of all the employees if a single unit was
found appropriate. Neither union was certified or sought an election. On the basis of Bell
Telephone, the Board dismissed the petition. Chairman Leedom, who dissented in Bell Tele-
phone, joined the majority in dismissing the petition. He distinguished Bell Telephone on
the ground that in that case the declaratory order determination went solely to the eligibility
of certain employees, while in the American Store case the declaratory order would go to
the basic appropriateness of two separate units.
45 1 K. DAvis, supra note 4, at 268.
46 National Labor Relations Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
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can be divided into three general categories of language: mandatory language,
which commands the Board to do something; prohibitory language, which forbids
the Board from acting in a particular manner; and operative language, which
explains when the mandatory or prohibitory language becomes relevant. Since
the specific language of the Act neither commands nor forbids the Board to do
anything relative to the use of a declaratory order, there is no specific restriction.
Would use of the declaratory order to resolve representation questions con-
flict with essential elements of the administrative process entrusted to the Board?
The rationale of the Bell Telephone decision is that since the Act provides a
specific statutory scheme consisting of elections and certifications for resolving
representation issues, such a scheme was intended by Congress to be exclusive.
Thus, for the Board to undertake clarification of a noncertified unit would be
to act contrary to Congressional intent. As noted earlier, however, the Board has
often determined the placement of employees in a unit through the clarification
or amendment procedures, neither of which is specifically provided for in the
statutory scheme. Since there is no significant difference between clarification of
a certified unit and clarification of a noncertified unit, to require that dissimilar
techniques be applied to each is irrational. Thus, although section 9(c)1 7 pro-
vides a specific scheme for the handling of certain types of representation issues,
this should not bar the use of other procedures where different issues are in-
volved. It follows from this analysis that the Board has discretionary power to
use declaratory relief, where appropriate, in representation cases.
Whether the Board should exercise this discretionary power remains to be
treated. The use of the declaratory order is in harmony with the expressed pur-
pose of the Act. Section 1 of the Act states, in pertinent part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and
to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-or-
ganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection."
The purpose of the Board, then, is to eliminate industrial strife and to en-
courage collective bargaining through positive procedures. Where a dispute can-
not be settled by the parties themselves, it will lead to industrial strife unless a
third party intervenes promptly to settle the controversy. It is likely that parties
who are seeking a unit determination without protracted litigation will turn to
the Board, which has acquired an expertise in these matters. If the Board does
not intervene and make a determination of the unit, this would exacerbate the
dispute and compel the parties and the Board to engage in the needless expense
of fruitless litigation - even though there is no question of the union's majority
status.
Further, section 9(b), which empowers the Board to make a unit determi-
47 Id., § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964).
48 Id., § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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nation, places only one restriction on this power - namely, that the determination
be such as will assure the employees "the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed" by the Act.4 9 It was argued in the Bell Telephone case that if a
unit determination were made of an uncertified unit without affording a self-
determination election, the employees would be denied their rights under the
Act.5" But the absence of a self-determination election does not, per se, deny
any rights guaranteed by the Act. If an employee doubts the union's majority,
he can file a decertification petition asking for an election 5 or an unfair labor
practice charge alleging that the employer is illegally recognizing a minority
union. Moreover, if the Board were to make a determination without an election
and certification, an aggrieved employee could sometimes obtain review under the
doctrine of Leedom v. Kyne.52
In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,"5 the Board reconsidered the Bell
Telephone decision and concluded that there was ample statutory support for
determining the status of employees in a unit that had never been formally found
appropriate by the Board.54 The Board squarely rejected any distinction between
clarifying a certified or uncertified unit, stating:
The Board has often determined the placement of employees whose status
is in dispute through the procedure of clarifying and modifying unit de-
terminations when circumstances have changed. We see no legally significant
difference in applying similar techniques to facts such as are present in this
case, even though no certification exists. 55
As a result of this decision, the Board amended its rules by adding section
102.60(b), which provides that "[a] petition for clarification of an existing
bargaining unit or a petition for amendment of certification, in the absence of a
question concerning representation, may be filed by a labor organization or by
an employer."56
The clarification procedures have opened the door for the settlement of
certain disputes that previously might have resulted in unfair labor practices.
49 Id., § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
50 Bell Telephone Co., 118 NLRB 371, 374 (1957).
51 Burry Biscuit Corp., 76 NLRB 640, 641 (1948). Further, the challenged union cannot
assert the representative interest of the petitioner. Id.
52 358 U.S. 184 (1958). There the Board included professional and nonprofessional
employees in the same unit without holding an election to determine the position of the pro-
fessional employees on the inclusion. The Court asserted its jurisdiction over this type of
matter holding:
It [unit determination without a vote] deprived the professional employees of a
"right" assured to them by Congress. Surely, in these circumstances, a Federal District
Court has jurisdiction of an original suit to prevent deprivation of a right so given.
Id. at 189.
53 145 NLRB 1521 '(1964).
54 Id. at 1523-24. The Board clearly recognized the need for determination of the
appropriate unit stating:
If we were to refuse to determine the unit placement of the contested employees,
we would be exacerbating a dispute which reached us in the first place because
the parties could not settle it themselves. We do not regard it as our function to
compel the parties . . . to engage in the expense of a needless election procedure
when there is no serious doubt of the Union's majority position. Accordingly, the
Bell Telephone decision is hereby reversed to the extent inconsistent herewith.
Id at 1524.
55 Id. at 1524.
56 29 C.F.R. 102.60(b) (1969).
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Thus, in a jurisdictional dispute there exists no reason why an employer should
have to wait until one or both unions commit some prohibited conduct before
having the situation resolved. In these circumstances, it is obvious that the con-
troversy is ripe as soon as two or more unions claim the disputed wdrk. 'If the
employer has contracts with either or both unions, or if either or both are cer-
tified, then the contracts or certificates can be amended to include the disputed
work. While there has been some confusion on this point in the past, " the Board
has granted motions to clarify in order to determine work assignment disputes."8
3. Employee Elections
The Board's third function in representation procedure is to supervise em-
ployee elections. In any election there are competing interest groups seeking to
attract the loyalty of the voter, and employee elections are no exception. Both
the employer and the union are attempting, through various devices, to win the
support of the employee. Here the Board's role is to establish the election ma-
chinery and to guarantee that neither employer nor union tactics interfere with
the right of the employee to cast an uncoerced vote. If either side interferes with
this right, the Board will set aside the election and direct a new one. Preelection
conduct, which may include speeches, leaflets, posters, campaign materials of
every sort, promises, or threats, may also furnish grounds for an unfair labor
practice complaint.
Because the parties' preelection -campaign conduct may have such serious
legal consequences, the declaratory order should be ,available to test the per-
missibility of contemplated action before it is taken. But this proposal has not
been unopposed. On the one hand, it is argued that the Board should not assist a
party in trimming his pattern of conduct to the minimum legal requirements,
for this would work to the detriment of the employees. There is also the feeling
that those who strain to tiptoe as close to the brink of the legal precipice as pos-
sible are not deserving of the Board's assistance. Under this approach, it is feared,
an employer or a union bringing a particular piece of election propaganda to, the
Board for approval will soon have the Board as a partner in the actual writing of
the propaganda. There may also be a social interest in keeping the borderline
between the permissible and the prohibited imprecise, as doubt itself will act as
a deterrent to parties approaching the center of the line.
On the other hand, there is a countervailing need for the parties, to know
precisely where the line is drawn. The social commitmentto maximum indi-
vidual freedom compels the Board to prescribe as clearly as it can the limits it
imposes on employer and union activity. The parties have a legitimate right to
convey their election platforms to the employees without fear that a certain phrase
or sentence will result in voiding the election. The fear that the Board will end
up preparing a party's organizational campaign is unreal, for there will always be
57 Hickey, Government Regulation of Inter-Union Work-Assignment Disputes, 16 S.C.
L. Rxv. 333, 364-75 (1964).'
58 McDonnell Co., 1968 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,413; Hayer Aircraft Corp.; No. 10-RC-1670
(1963); Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 20-RC-3838 (1963). If the employees are covered by
neither contract nor certificate, their placement must be determined by an election. News
Syndicate Co., 141 NLRB 573, 577 (1963).
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variations in propaganda from plant to plant, and the Board possesses the dis-
cretion to refuse a case if it believes a party is abusing this procedure.
The question is admittedly close, but this author would tip the scale in favor
of allowing the declaratory order. While the above considerations were dis-
cussed with regard to election propaganda, the same factors must be considered
whenever the issue involves questionable legality of prospective conduct. In each
situation, all factors should be considered before making a determination.
C. Unfair Labor Practice Cases
In one sense, certain of the Board's orders in unfair labor practice matters
resemble declaratory orders. For example, when a party is found guilty of an
unfair labor practice, he is usually forbidden to further engage in the practice
found illegal by the Board. The cease and desist order, though based on a viola-
tion of the Act, involves no penalty unless the violator refuses to comply with the
Board order. (These orders, of course, are not strictly declaratory since they
contain a characteristic coercive element - they command that certain activity
not be done.) A fortiori, a decision by the Board in favor of the accused party
would also be quasi-declaratory. Another example of quasi-declaratory procedure
is the section 10(k) 9 proceeding, which resolves a jurisdictional question by af-
firmatively awarding disputed work to one of the contesting groups. In this
proceeding the Board adjudicates the rights of the parties to the work, but it
does not issue a cease and desist order enforceable in the courts. The Board,
however, has never issued a declaratory order based on an anticipated unfair labor
practice. Nor will the declaratory procedure normally be used in discrimination
cases due to complex factual patterns and a lack of ripeness.
Plagued with uncertainty, the statutory duty to bargain in certain labor
disputes poses a constant threat of disruption in industrial stability. Judicious
application of the declaratory order in this area would replace uncertainty with
clarity. Section 8(a) (5)0 and section 8(b) (3), 61 when interpreted in con-
junction with section 8(d),62 make it unlawful for an employer or union to
refuse to bargain in good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." This statutory obligation encompasses the duty
to recognize a duly selected bargaining representative, to negotiate with that
representative on mandatory subjects of bargaining, and to refrain from terminat-
ing or modifying a contract during renegotiation without serving advance notice
on the other party.6 '
Where a union is certified by the Board subsequent to an election, the
employer will seldom have difficulty in determining his duty to recognize and
59 National Labor Relations Act § 10(k), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) '(1964).
60 Id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
61 Id. § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964). Section 8(b)(3) reads as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the
representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of
this title ....
62 Id. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
63 Id.
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bargain with it. Where an employer doubts the majority status of an incumbent
bargaining representative, however, he should be able to obtain a judgment from
the Board as to his obligations vis-a-vis the union.
At present, the employer faces a dilemma. If he continues to recognize a
union that is later found to lack the support of a majority of employees, he risks
a section 8(a) (2)" charge. If he does not recognize the union that is in fact en-
titled to recognition, he faces a possible section 8 (a) (5) violation," unless he can
demonstrate a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status.6 The issuance
of a declaratory order where present procedure is inadequate would accommodate
the needs of both labor and management.
The declaratory order would also be extremely useful in determining the,
status of a subject of bargaining. Under the Act, subjects of bargaining are
divided into three classes: mandatory, permissive, and illegal. Only mandatory
subjects can be safely bargained to an impasse6 Because the statute does not
classify the subjects of bargaining in detail, the parties do not always know into
which class a particular subject will fall. Rather than be forced to reach a dead-
lock in negotiations, the parties should be able to file with the Board a petition
seeking to clarify whether a subject in dispute is mandatory, permissive, or illegal.
This issue arose in the Mobil Oil Co. case. There the parties had entered into
twelve prior contracts, each containing a clause allowing supervisors to retain
their seniority in the unit. During negotiations for a new contract, the union
demanded a paragraph under which a supervisor would, lose his seniority if
during a strike he performed work normally performed by an employee in the
unit. The company refused to yield on this point. Both parties agreed that the
issue should not obstruct the signing of the contract. The union agreed to sign
the contract under protest with the understanding that it would file an unfair
labor practice charge. It was further agreed that the supervisory seniority clause
would be deleted from the contract if the Board declared it to be a nonmandatory
64 Id. § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1964). Section 8(a)(2) in pertinent part
states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation . . . of any labor or-
ganization ....
That the employer in good faith thought the union to be the representative of a majority
of employees is irrelevant. Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 739 (1961).
65 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) '(1964). This dilemma
is somewhat relieved by section 9(c) (1)(B), which permits an employer to file a petition
seeking an election among his employees when faced with a claim for recognition by a union.
The employer must "demonstrate by objective considerations" that he has reasonable grounds
for believing that the union has lost its majority status before the Board will act on the petition.
United States Gypsum Co., 161 NLRB 601 (1966).
66 Fort Smith Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 874, 880 '(8th Cir. 1965).
67 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). Further,
there has been a tendency to require the employer to furnish the union with data concerning
mandatory subjects of bargaining. In NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 108 NLRB 1537, 1539,
enforced, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955), an employer was
required to provide wage rates of particular employees. In Montgomery Ward & Co., 90
NLRB 1244, 1246-47 (1950), the Board found an 8(a) (5) violation where the employer re-
fused to disclose names and merit ratings of employees, production standards, and prospec-
tive changes in benefit plans. Finally in Dixie Mfg. Co., 79 NLRB 645, 658 (1948), the
employer was required to produce information concerning employee production requirements
and methods used to calculate individual earnings.
68 147 NLRB 337 (1964).
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subject of bargaining. Conversely, if the Board held the clause to be a mandatory
subject of bargaining, it would remain in the contract.
The Board held the supervisory seniority clause to be a mandatory subject
of bargaining. 9 The interesting point about the case is that the employer con-
tended that if the Board held the clause to be a permissive subject of bargaining,
it would be issuing a declaratory judgment beyond its authority, for under the
circumstances, no sanction could be imposed. Rather than face the issue head-on,
the Board merely observed in a footnote that in view of its disposition of the
case it need not reach this issue. ° It would certainly have been preferable for
the Board to treat the case as one for a declaratory order. But in view of the
Board's action, it seems unlikely that it will allow parties to utilize the declaratory
process to determine the status of subjects of bargaining.7 '
The third possibility for the utilization of the declaratory order in this area
arises where an employer contemplates changes during the contract term. An
employer cannot unilaterally change a condition of employment unless the union
has waived its right to be consulted about the change. In these circumstances,
questions arise as to whether the union has waived its rights and, if not, what
the particular obligation of the employer may be. In order to conduct business in
a modem society, it is important for an employer to be able to effectuate change
(i.e., mergers, acquisitions, and subcontracting) without fear that unfair labor
practice charges will be filed against him. Even where a party believes that he
will ultimately prevail, defending an unfair labor practice charge exposes the
employer to unwarranted cost and delay. A declaratory order would permit an
employer to protect his investment against further expenditures. Additionally,
if the employer has erroneously evaluated the situation, the declaratory process
allows him to take whatever steps are necessary to conform to the Board's de-
cision without a further outlay of money.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to demonstrate how the declaratory process could
be used to further promote industrial stability. It is clear that the deterrent
effect of prospective prohibitions will prevent the needless infliction of industrial
unrest upon the community. Nevertheless, the Board has been extremely reluctant
to allow the industrial community to take full advantage of this process. In
certain areas, such as unfair labor practices, the procedure is nonexistent; in
other areas, such as jurisdiction and representation, it is severely limited in scope.
Thus, the Board should reevaluate its thinking and establish declaratory order
procedures to adequately meet the needs of the community.
69 Id. at 340.
70 Id. at 340 n.4.
71 Under a memorandum of agreement signed by Local 12 of the Operating Engineers
and the Southern California Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, Engineering &
Grading Contractors Association, and the Building Industry Association, all parties agreed to
abide by a Board determination of the bargainability of strike insurance. If the Board de-
termines that this is not a bargainable issue, the subject is closed. If the Board decides that it
is a mandatory subject of bargaining, negotiations on the issue will open within sixty days.
The Board determination is being made pursuant to an unfair labor practice charge filed by
the three associations. BNA, Construction Labor Report No. 726, Aug. 20, 1969.
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